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Comments
ADMISSIBILITY OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN
RAPE PROSECUTIONS IN MISSOURI
I. INTRODUCTION
The admissibility of character evidence in rape prosecutions is a
topic of no small controversy. Prosecuting attorneys urge reform, alleging
that present rules of evidence force victims to endure such humiliation and
embarrassment that many women refuse even to report the crime.' Further-
more, they claim the evidence presented to juries to attack the victim's
character is so prejudicial that guilty defendants are often set free.2 How-
ever, defense attorneys argue that because of the nature of the crime, the
fact that it is rarely witnessed, and the natural prejudice against one
accused of such an offense, the only effective defense available is a probing
inquiry into the credibility of the accuser.
Authors of several recent law review articles have presented both the
prosecution'ss and defense attorneys' 4 points of view. Legislation proposing
reform has been introduced in several state legislatures, including Mis-
souri.5 The general public has been made increasingly aware of the topic
by a number of books exploring the sociological and psychological causes
and ramifications of rape.6 Moreover, the entertainment media has drama-
1. "[L]aw enforcement administrators recognize that this offense (Rape)
is probably one of the most underreported crimes due primarily to fear and/or
embarrassment on the part of the victims." FEERAL BuREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
UNiFORm CRIME REPORTS 22 (1975).
2. Out of every 100 reported rapes, approximately 51 men are arrested, 31
are prosecuted, 15 are acquitted, 11 are found guilty of the offense charged, and
5 are convicted of lesser offenses. Id.
3. Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L.
REv. 919 (1973); Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View,
11 Am. CRiM. L. REv. 335 (1973).
4. Comment, The Trial of a Rape Case: An Advocate's Analysis of Cor-
roboration, Consent, and Character, 11 Am. Cum. L. REv. 309 (1973).
5. Two bills were introduced in the 1976 session of the Missouri legislature,
neither of which passed. They were typical of the types of reform being proposed
nationally.
House Bill 1327 provided that in prosecutions for rape or attempted rape,
opinion evidence, reputation evidence, and evidence of specific instances of sexual
conduct of the complaining witness would not be admissible except in special
instances. If a defendant wishes to offer such evidence under the permitted
exceptions, he would have to make an offer of proof and the judge would have
to hold an in camera hearing to determine what evidence may go to the jury.
Senate Bill 644 provided that in the prosecution of sexual offenses, the defend-
ant may not offer evidence of the prior sexual conduct of the alleged victim,
except in certain situations where a written motion has been filed by the de-
fense regarding such prior conduct and a hearing has been held out of the
presence of the jury to determine the relevancy of such prior conduct.
6. S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINsr OuR WILL: MEN, WOasFN AND RAPE (1975);
M. AzmR, PATTERNs IN FORCIBLE RAPE (1971).
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tized, indeed in some instances exaggerated and distorted, the situation.
In spite of, or perhaps because of, this burgeoning body of information,
there exists a great deal of confusion and misinformation both about what
the law is and what it should be.
This comment will attempt to present an unbiased summary of the
present law in Missouri regarding the admissibility of character evidence
in rape prosecutions. Missouri statutes divide the crime of rape into three
separate offenses depending on the age and previous character of the
woman. Because the rules of admissibility vary, each offense will be dis-
cussed individually. Different rules also govern the admissibility of evi-
dence of general character as opposed to evidence of specific acts of im-
morality and the comment is subdivided accordingly.
II. STATUTORY RAPE: INTERCOURSE WITH A FEMALE UNDER AGE SIXTEEN
A. Elements of the Crime
Missouri law defines rape as either forcibly having intercourse with
a female 16 years of age or older, or having intercourse with a female under
that age regardless of her consent.7 The latter act is commonly referred
to as "statutory rape." The purpose of this part of the statute is dearly
to protect a girl under the age of 16 from her own immaturity and weak-
ness.8 The protection is absolute. All that need be shown for a conviction
is that the defendant had sexual intercourse with a female who was in
fact under age 16 at the time.9 It makes no difference how old the de-
fendant thought the girl was or what basis he had for that belief.10 It is
immaterial whether force was used11 or whether the girl consented.12
7. The primary Missouri statute on rape is section 559.260, RSMo 1969,
which provides:
Every person who shall he convicted of rape, either by carnally and unlaw-
fully knowing any female child under the age of sixteen years, or by
forcibly ravishing any woman of the age of sixteen years or upwards,
shall suffer death, or be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary
for not less than two years, in the discretion of the jury.
8. State v. Blessing, 183 S.W. 279 (Mo. 1916).
9. An amendment to the statute in 1921 raised the age of consent from
fourteen to sixteen, thereby extending the length of protection, but the same
amendment lowered the minimum term of imprisonment upon ,conviction from
five to two years.
10. State v. Basket, 111 Mo. 271, 19 S.W. 1097 (1892); State v. Houx, 109
Mo. 654, 19 S.W. 35 (1892).
11. State v. Weekly, 223 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1949); State v. King, 342 Mo. 975,
119 S.W.2d 277 (1938); State v. Blessing, 183 S.W. 279 (Mo. 1916); State v. George,
214 Mo. 262, 113 S.W. 1116 (1908); State v. Ernest, 150 Mo. .347, 51 S.W. 688
(1899).
12. State v. Lawson, 136 S.W.2d 992 (Mo. 1940); State v. Conrad, 322 Mo,
246, 14 S.W.2d 608 (1928); State v. Gruber, 285 S.W. 426 (Mo. 1926); State v.
Nevitt, 270 S.W. 337 (Mo. 1924); State v. Ansel, 256 S.W. 762 -(Mo. 1923); State
v. Shellman, 192 S.W. 435 (Mo. 1917); State v. George, 214 Mo. 262, 113 S.W.
1116 (1908); State v. Allen, 174 Mo. 689, 74 S.W. 839 (1903); State v. Ernest,
150 Mo. 347, 51 S.W. 688 (1899); State v. Duffey, 128 Mo. 549, 81 S.W. 98 (1895);
State v. Lacey, 111 Mo. 513, 20 S.W. 238 (1892); State v. Wray, 109 Mo. 594, 19
S.W. 86 (1892). The prosecution is entitled to a jury instruction that consent
is no defense. State v. Mace, 278 S.W. 718 (Mo.t 1925)..Even a later marriage of
1976]
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The question of what kind of evidence should be admissible is brought
sharply into focus by the fact that the defendant can be convicted solely
on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim,13 unless such testimony
is contradictory or totally unbelievable.1 4 Because neither force nor lack
of consent are elements of the crime,1 5 evidence that the victim made
outcry or complaint is immaterial and therefore inadmissible in some
jurisdictions.'8 In Missouri, however, evidence that a complaint or outcry
was made is always admissible where there is any evidence that the rape
was accomplished by force, 1 and some decisions have held such evidence
admissible even without any reference to force.' 8 Likewise, evidence of
a failure to make complaint or outcry is admissible,' 9 but neither prosecu-
tion2 0 nor defense 2 ' is entitled to a jury instruction concerning such evi-
dence.
B. Evidence of the Victim's Character
1. Specific Acts of Immorality
Evidence of previous immoral conduct, short of actual intercourse,
between the defendant and the prosecutrix is admissible when offered
the prosecutrix and the defendant will not bar a prosecution. However, as a
practical matter, such a prosecution would be unlikely due to the husband-wife
immunity which would prevent the wife from testifying but it has happened.
State v. Evans, 138 Mo. 116, 39 S.W. 462 (1897).
13. State v. Lee, 404 S.W.2d 740 (Mo. 1966); State v. Nash, 272 S.W.2d 179
(Mo. 1954); State v. Wood, 355 Mo. 1008, 199 S.W.2d 396 (1947); State v. Burton,
355 Mo. 792, 198 S.W.2d 19 (1946); State v. Lawson, 136 S.W.2d 992 (Mo. 1940);
State v. Ball, 133 S.W.2d 414 (Mo. 1939); State v. King, 342 Mo. 975, 119 S.W.2d
277 (1938); State v. Mitchell, 86 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. 1935); State v. Gruber, 285
S.W. 426 (Mo. 1926); State v. Wade, 306 Mo. 457, 268 S.W. 52 (1924); State v.
Smith, 237 S.W. 482 (Mo. 1922); State v. Hammontree, 177 S.W. 367 (Mo. 1915);
State v. Hughes, 258 Mo. 264, 167 S.W. 529 (1914); State v. Stackhouse, 242
Mo. 444, 146 S.W. 1151 (1912); State v. Wilcox, 111 Mo. 569, 20 S.W. 314
(1892). In Ball, supra, the only evidence introduced was the girl's testimony, and
she did not come forward until more than a year after the offense. If the testimony
of the prosecutrix is contradictory and conflicts with physical facts, surrounding
circumstances, and ordinary experience, then it must be corroborated.
14. State v. Tevis, 234 Mo. 276, 136 S.W. 339 (1911); State v. Goodale, 210
Mo. 275, 109 S.W. 9 (1908).
15. Cases cited notes 11 and 12 supra.
16. See 3 H. UNDERHML, CamiNAL EvnENcE § 757 at 1738 (5th ed. 1957); 4
J. WIGMORE, EvIDCE § 1133 at 223 (3d ed. 1940) and cases cited therein.
17. State v. Hammontree, 177 S.W. 367 (Mo. 1915); State v. Palmberg, 199
Mo. 233, 97 S.W. 566 (1906). The details of a complaint made to a third person
are dearly hearsay and therefore inadmissible unless the prosecutrix has been
impeached by prior inconsistent statements and the statements made in the com-
plaint are used as prior consistent statements to rehabilitate the prosecutrix on
that specific point. State v. Fleming, 354 Mo. 31, 188 S.W.2d 12 (1945); State v.Richardson, 349 Mo. 1103, 163 S.W.2d 956 (1942).
18. State v. Robinson, 106 S.W.2d 425 (Mo. 1937); State v. Conrad, 322 Mo.
246, 14 S.W.2d 608 (1928).19. State v. Richardson, 349 Mo. 1103, 163 S.W.2d 956 (1942).
20. An instruction that the jury should consider the failure of the prosecutrix
to complain promptly has been held "a comment upon the prosecutrix' testimony
on a point not within the issuable facts." State v. Bowman, 278 Mo. 492, 497, 213
S.W. 64, 65 (1919).
21. State v. Richardson, 349 Mo. 1103, 163 S.W.2d 956 (1942).
[vol. 41
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by the prosecution, because it tends to show the relationship between
the parties and their inclination to engage in intercourse.2 2 In State v.
Bascue2 3 the appellant, who had been convicted of the statutory rape of
his 14 year old stepdaughter, argued that the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of prior acts of "messing around" with the child because such
acts constituted the separate crime of child molestation which was not
reasonably related to the subsequent act of statutory rape. The general
rule is that evidence of other criminal acts, if offered to prove the crime
charged, is inadmissible except when it tends to establish motive, intent,
or a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of separate similar
crimes so interrelated that proof of one tends to prove the others.2 4 The
court in Bascue held these prior acts are so related to the act charged as
to be admissible.2 5 The court said these acts showed the state of intimacy
between the parties and constituted "the foundation for an antecedent
probability"2 6 that the parties engaged in intercourse.2 7
A fortiori, evidence of prior acts of intercourse between the prose-
cutrix and the defendant is admissible as tending to create an "antecedent
probability'" of crime charged. 28 Previous acts of intercourse as remote as
seven years prior to the act charged have been held admissible because
they demonstrate a pattern of sexual misconduct continuing over an
extended period.29 The statute of limitations imposes no restrictions on
admission into evidence of offenses barred by the statute.3 0 An objection
based on remoteness is untenable because this factor affects only the
weight and not the admissibility of the testimony.3 ' However, the state
cannot introduce evidence of subsequent acts of intercourse, 2 even evi-
dence that the defendant regularly had intercourse with the prosecutrix
with her consent after she reached age sixteen83 in a prosecution for one
act of intercourse before the girl attained that age.
22. "[P]rior amorous acts, which ordinarily precede the sexual act, although
actually constituting assaults and therefore separate offenses may properly be
shown." State v. Cooper, 271 S.W. 471, 474 (Mo. 1923).
23. 485 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1972).
24. C. McCozucK, EvmENcE § 42 at 82 (2d ed. 1972).
25. State v. Bascue, 485 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1972).
26. Id.
27. See also State v. Garner, 481 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1972); State v. Akers,
328 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. 1959); State v. Baker, 318 Mo. 542, 300 S.W. 699 (1927);
State v. Pruitt, 202 Mo. 49, 100 S.W. 431 (1907).
28. State v. Tyler, 306 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1957); State v. Burkhart, 242 S.W.2d
12 (Mo. 1951); State v. King, 342 Mo. 975, 119 S.W.2d 277 (1938); State v. Hersh,
296 S.W. 433 (Mo. 1927); State v. Cooper, 271 S.W. 471 (Mo. 1925); State v.
Cason, 252 S.W. 688 (Mo. 1923).
29. State v. Richardson, 349 Mo. 1103, 163 S.W.2d 956 (1942).
80. Id.
31. State v. Bascue, 485 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1972). See also State v. Simerly, 463
S.W.2d 846 (Mo. 1971).
32. State v. Amende, 338 Mo. 717, 92 S.W.2d 106 (1936); State v. Bullington,
274 S.W. 18 (Mo. 1925); State v. Guye, 299 Mo. 348, 252 S.W. 955 (1923); State
v. Arnold, 267 Mo. 33, 183 S.W. 289 (1916); State v. Palmberg, 199 Mo. 233, 97
S.W. 566 (1906).
33. State v. Caldwell, 311 Mo. 534, 278 S.W. 700 (1925).
1976]
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It is a felony to have carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of
sixteen, regardless of whether others have had such knowledge of her.
Therefore, evidence offered by the defendant of the victim's specific immoral
acts with others is immaterial and inadmissible.3 4
2. General Reputation of the Victim
A number of old Missouri cases held that the general bad reputation
of the prosecutrix could be shown to affect her credibility if she took the
stand to testify3 5 This was consistent with the rule which existed at the
time that the general bad reputation of any witness for morality could
be shown to impeach.386 This rule was reversed by State v. Williams,3 7
which held that the general reputation for morality was inadmissible as
bearing on the credibility of a witness. The rule in State v. Williams has
been applied in prosecutions for forcible rape, s but no case has specifically
held it applicable to statutory rape. Unless a different rationale is to be
followed due to the age of the prosecuting witness, this rule rejecting
general reputation for morality as bearing on the credibility of the prose-
cuting witness is applicable to statutory rape prosecutions. Moreover, be-
cause consent of the victim is immaterial, her general reputation for
morality is inadmissible on that issue.
C. Evidence of the Defendant's Character
Missouri courts have recognized the precarious position of one who
stands accused of statutory rape. In State v. Seay8 9 the Supreme Court of
Missouri stated:
A crime of the character of the one with which the defendant
is charged is so abhorrent that conviction is easy; in fact, the
charge is almost equivalent to a conviction. So strong is the preju-
dice against a defendant in such case that the court must take every
precaution to see that he obtains an impartial trial.40
I. Specific Acts of Immorality
Evidence of specific acts of immorality on the part of the defendant
with anyone other than the prosecutrix is generally inadmissible. It is
never permissible for the prosecution to prove that the defendant has
34. State v. Smith, 289 S.W. 590 (Mo. 1926); State v. Shobe, 268 S.W. 81
(Mo. 1924); State v. Ansel, 256 S.W. 762 (Mo. 1923); State v. Guye, 299 Mo. 348,
252 S.W. 955 (1923); State v. Loness, 238 S.W. 112 (Mo. 1922); State v. Devorss,
221 Mo. 469, 120 S.W. 75 (1909).
35. State v. Stevens, 325 Mo. 434, 29 S.W.2d 113 (1930); State v. Guye,
299 Mo. 348, 252 S.W. 955 (1923); State v. Loness, 238 S.W. 112 (Mo. 1922);
State v. Nibarger, 255 Mo. 289, 164 S.W. 453 (1914); State v. Duffey, 128 Mo.
549, 31 S.W. 98 (1895).
36. State v. Shields, 13 Mo. 236 (1850).
37. 337 Mo. 889, 87 S.W.2d 175 (1935).
38. State v. Kain, 330 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1960).
39. 282 Mo. 672, 222 S.W. 427 (1920).
40. Id. at 679, 22 S.W. at 429.
Evol. 41
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had illicit relations with women over the age of consent.41 Likewise, it
is generally held to be reversible error to permit the introduction of evi-
dence that the defendant has had illicit relations with females under the
age of sixteen.42 Such evidence is obviously highly prejudicial and does not
tend to make it more probable that the defendant is guilty of the offense
for which he is on trial.43 However, in a few situations, evidence of a
specific, prior, similar crime has been held properly admitted. For example,
in State v. King4 4 a porter in a private school was charged with the statutory
rape of a pupil. Correspondence between defendant and another pupil
indicating that defendant had committed a similar offense with the second
pupil, although inadmissible as part of the state's case in chief, was admissi-
ble in rebuttal when defendant raised the issue by testifying that he never
"got smart" with any other pupils.
2. General Reputation of the Defendant
The general rule in all criminal prosecutions is that the prosecution
cannot introduce evidence that the defendant's general reputation for
morality is bad, unless the defendant, in an attempt to bolster his own
credibility, calls a witness to testify to his good character and reputation.45
In such a case, the state may call witnesses to show that his general reputa-
tion for morality is bad. It is also proper for the state to cross-examine
thoroughly defendant's character witness for the purpose of testing the
witness' knowledge of the defendant's reputation, the witness' sources of
information, and the witness' credibility. The extent of permissible cross-
examination of the defendant's character witness is largely within the
trial court's discretion.46 This type of questioning is proper even if it
relates to crimes other than the one charged.4 7 In order to determine
upon what the character witness bases his judgment, it is permissible to
inquire of the witness whether he had heard it rumored that defendant
was involved in other criminal acts which would reflect upon defendant's
character.48 However, such questions are improper unless such rumors
are actually being circulated. 49 It is not permissible for the prosecutor,
41. State v. Hayes, 356 Mo. 1033, 204 S.W.2d 723 (1947); State v. Cox, 263
S.W. 215 (Mo. 1924); State v. Bowman, 272 Mo. 491, 199 S.W. 161 (1917); State
v. Burgess, 259 Mo. 383, 168 S.W. 740 (1914).
42. State v. Spinks, 344 Mo. 105, 125 S.W.2d 60 (1939); State v. Bowman,
272 Mo. 491, 199 S.W. 161 (1917); State v. Smith, 250 Mo. 274, 157 S.W. 307
(1913); State v. Horton, 247 Mo. 657, 153 S.W. 1051 (1913); State v. Teeter,
239 Mo. 475, 144 S.W. 445 (1912).
43. Cases cited note 42 supra.
44. 342 Mo. 975, 119 S.W.2d 277 (1938).
45. State v. Williams, 337 Mo. 884, 87 S.W.2d 175 (1935).
46. State v. Cooper, 271 S.W. 471 (Mo. 1925); State v. Seay, 282 Mo. 672, 222
S.W. 427 (1920); State v. Phillips, 233 Mo. 299, 135 S.W. 4 (1911); State v. Harris,
209 Mo. 423, 108 S.W. 28 (1908); State v. Parker, 172 Mo. 191, 72 S.W. 650
(1903).
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under the pretext of testing the credibility and information of the character
witness, to bring before the jury bad acts or crimes which occurred after
the offenses charged or about which the character witness would have no
way of knowing.uO
III. STATUTORY RAPE: INTERCOURSE WITH A FEMALE OF PREViousLY
CHASTE CHARAcrER BETWEEN THE AGES OF SIXTEEN AND EIGHTEEN
A. Elements of the Crime
Missouri law extends, by a separate statutory rape statute, the period
of protection an additional two years for young women of "previously
chaste character." 51 Being of "previously chaste character" means simply
that the young woman was a virgin prior to the act charged.5 2 This fact
must be proved affirmatively by the state.53 Although earlier Missouri cases
held that chastity was presumed until the contrary was shown,G4 the clear
rule today is that there is no presumption that the prosecutrix was chaste.5 5
However, defendant is not entitled to an instruction that no presumption
exists, because such an instruction would have a tendency to mislead
the jury into assuming that a contrary presumption exists. 6 If the state
establishes that the young woman was of "previously chaste character,"
the same protection given a female under age sixteen is applicable-i.e.,
both the consent of the prosecutrix5 7 and the use of force5 8 are immaterial.
In a prosecution under this statute the defendant can be convicted
50. Id. It is, of course, improper for the prosecutor to state to the jury during
dosing argument, or at any other time, his personal belief in the guilt of the
defendant, because the jury may put undue weight on this opinion and assume
that it is based on information not in evidence. Id. See also State v. Reppley, 278
Mo. 333, 213 S.W. 477 (1919); State v. Webb, 254 Mo. 414, 162 S.W. 622 (1914);
State v. Hess, 240 Mo. 147, 144 S.W. 489 (1912).
51. § 559.300, RSMo 1969, provides:
If any person over the age of seventeen years shall have carnal knowledge
of any unmarried female, of previously chaste character, between the age
of sixteen and eighteen years of age, he shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the peni-
tentiary for a term of two years, or by a fine of not less than one hundred
dollars nor more than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment in the
county jail for not less than one month or more than six months, or
by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
52. State v. Luckett, 246 S.W. 881 (Mo. 1922); State v. Cook, 207 S.W. 831
(Mo. 1918). The defendant is not entitled to an instruction on the meaning of
"previously chaste character" because "an ordinary intelligent juror would under-
stand that the phrase referred to a female who had never indulged in an act of
sexual intercourse." State v. Wells, 367 S.W.2d 652, 655-56 (Mo. 1963).
53. State v. Cook, 207 S.W. 831 (Mo. 1918); State v. Volz, 269 Mo. 194,
190 S.W. 307 (1916); State v. Kelly, 245 Mo. 489, 150 S.W. 1057 (1912); State v.
McMahon, 234 Mo. 611, 137 S.W. 872 (1911).
54. State v. Kelly, 191 Mo. 680, 90 S.W. 834 (1905).
55. State v. Volz, 269 Mo. 194, 190 S.W. 307 (1916); State v. Kelly, 245 Mo. 489,
150 S.W. 1057 (1912).
56. State v. Volz, 269 Mo. 194, 190 S.W. 307 (1916).
57. State v. Wells, 367 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. 1963); State v. Volz, 269 Mo. 194,
190 S.W. 307 (1916); State v. Taylor, 267 Mo. 41, 183 S.W. 299 (1916).
58. Cases cited note 57 supra.
[Vol. 41
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solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix.5 9 Corroboration is not necessary
unless her testimony is contradictory or unconvincing when "applied to
the admitted facts and ordinary experiences of mankind."6 0
B. Evidence of the Victim's Character
1. Specific Acts of Immorality
Because virginity of the prosecutrix is an essential element of the
offense, prior specific acts of intercourse on her part are clearly relevant
and admissible.61 Any prior act of intercourse with others62 or with the
defendant 68 is, if proved, a complete defense to a prosecution under this
statute. If the evidence indicates more than one act of intercourse with
the defendant, he can only be convicted of the first act, because the woman
was not "of chaste character" at the time of the later acts.64 The statute
of limitations starts to run as of the first act of intercourse. 65
Courts have stated that prior specific acts of immorality are inadmissi-
ble to impeach the credibility of the prosecutrix, 66 but this prohibition
is meaningless because specific prior acts are admissible on the issue of
chastity.6 7 However, evidence of specific acts of intercourse occurring sub-
sequent to the crime charged is inadmissible for any purpose.68
2. General Reputation of the Victim
The defendant may offer evidence that the general reputation of the
prosecutrix for chastity was bad prior to the offense charged because such
evidence is relevant to the issue of chastity.6 9 The rationale for admitting
such evidence is that, although "chaste character" and a "reputation for
chastity" are not the same, reputation is still some evidence of actual
character.7 0 Likewise, the prosecution may offer evidence that the prose-
cutrix' general reputation for morality was good prior to the offense
because it tends to prove her "previously chaste character." 7 ' Evidence
59. State v. Clark, 353 Mo. 470, 182 S.W.2d 619 (1944); State v. Cox, 263
S.W. 215 (Mo. 1924); State v. Wade, 306 Mo. 457, 268 S.W. 52 (1924); State v.
Hughes, 258 Mo. 264, 167 S.W. 529 (1914); State v. Tevis, 234 Mo. 276, 136 S.W.
339 (1911); State v. Day, 188 Mo. 359, 87 S.W. 465 (1905).
60. See cases cited note 59 supra.
61. State v. Foster, 225 S.W. 671 (Mo. 1920); State v. Cook, 207 S.W. 831
(Mo. 1918); State v. Weber, 272 Mo. 475, 199 S.W. 147 (1917).
62. Cases cited note 61 supra.
63. State v. Foster, 225 S.W. 671 (Mo. 1920); State v. Schenk, 238 Mo. 429,
142 S.W. 263 (1911); State v. McMahon, 234 Mo. 611, 137 S.W. 872 (1911).
64. State v. Schenk, 238 Mo. 429, 142 S.W. 263 (1911).
65. State v. McMahon, 234 Mo. 611, 137 S.W. 872 (1911).
66. See, e.g., State v. Luckett, 246 S.W. 881 (Mo. 1922).
67. State v. Cook, 207 S.W. 831 (Mo. 1918); State v. Weber, 272 Mo. 475,
199 S.W. 147 (1917).
68. State v. Perrigin, 258 Mo. 233, 167 S.W. 573 (1914).
69. Character refers to what a person really is while reputation is only what
public opinion reputes him to be. State v. Cook, 207 S.W. 831, 833 (Mo. 1918).
70. Id.
71. State v. Taylor, 267 Mo. 41, 183 S.W. 299 (1916). State v. Kelley, 191
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of the general reputation of the prosecutrix subsequent to the offense
charged is inadmissible.72
Older Missouri cases held that if the prosecuting witness testified,
evidence of her general bad reputation for morality would be admissible
to impeach her credibility.73 This rule has not been followed in Missouri
since 1935 when the supreme court held in State v. Williams74 that the
general reputation of a witness is inadmissible as bearing on the issue
of credibility. Presently, the only general reputation evidence admissible
to impeach a witness is general reputation for truth and veracity. 5
C. Evidence of Defendant's Character
Despite the dearth of cases on this issue, it appears that the rules
governing the admissibility of evidence of the defendant's character when
the charge is statutory rape of a "chaste" 16 to 18 year old are the same
as those applicable in a prosecution for the statutory rape of a girl under
the age of 16.76 Because the only difference between the two offenses is
the characteristics of the victim, there is no reason to treat evidence of
the defendant's character any differently.
IV. FORCIBLE RAPE
A. Elements of the Crime
In Missouri the essential elements of forcible rape77 are: (1) penetra-
tion (however slight) of a female's sexual organs;7 8 (2) accomplished by
force or threats;" 9 and (3) against the will of the woman.8 0 The state,
of course, must prove these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.8 '
The force used must be sufficient to overcome the "utmost resistance"
of the woman-i.e., to overpower the mind, thereby negating consent.82
72. State v. Day, 188 Mo. 359, 87 S.W. 465 (1905).
73. State v. Shearon, 183 S.W. 293 (Mo. 1916).
74. 337 Mo. 884, 87 S.W.2d 175 (1935). See also State v. Kain, 330 S.W.2d
842 (Mo. 1960).
75. State v. Williams, 492 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
76. Evidence that the defendant proposed marriage, either before or after
the alleged act of intercourse is admissible on the theory that a subsequent promise
of marriage shows a "consciousness of guilt and a desire to conceal the offense"
and a prior promise bears on the issue of chastity in that it indicates why the
woman submitted. State v. Walker, 357 Mo. 394, 208 S.W.2d 233 (1948); State
v. Oliver, 337 Mo. 1037, 87 S.W.2d 644 (1935); State v. Reed, 237 Mo. 224, 140
S.W. 909 (1911).
77. § 559.260, RSMo 1969.
78. State v. Oliver, 333 Mo. 1231, 64 S.W.2d 118 (1983); State v. Ruhr, 533
S.W.2d 656 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
79. State v. Garrett, 494 SW.2d 336 (Mo. 1973); State v. Deckard, 426 S.W.2d
88 (Mo 1968); State v. Egner, 317 Mo. 427, 296 S.W. 145 (1927); State v. Catron,
317 Mo. 894, 296 S.W. 141 (1927); State v. Johnson, 316 Mo. 86, 289 S.W.
847 (1926); State v. Barbour, 234 Mo. 526, 137 S.W. 874 (1911); State v. Neal, 178
Mo. 63, 76 S.W. 958 (1903); State v. Cunningham, 100 Mo. 382, 12 S.W. 376(1889); State v. Ruhr, 533 S.W.2d 656, (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976)
80. See cases cited note 79 supra.
81. State v. Moore, 435 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
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Such force need not be actually applied, but may be merely an "array
of force."83 Unless the woman demonstrates the "utmost reluctance" to
engage in the act and presents the "greatest resistance" of which she is
capable, she will be deemed to have consented.8 4 However, consent induced
by a fear of personal violence is no consent,8 5 and thus the utmost resistance
doctrine is not applicable when the woman is put in fear of injury.8 6
In other words, the amount of resistance necessary depends on the use-
lessness of resistance.87
A conviction of forcible rape may generally be sustained on the
uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix.8 8 However, if the prosecutrix'
testimony is in conflict with surrounding circumstances and ordinary
experience, it must be corroborated. 89 Thus the need for corroboration
must be decided on a case by case basis.90
Evidence that the prosecutrix made an outcry or complaint following
the alleged rape is not excluded by the hearsay rule.91 Likewise, evidence
83. State v. Kirkpatrick, 428 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1968); State v. Wynn, 357
S.W.2d 936 (Mo. 1962); State v. Schuster, 282 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. 1955); State v.
Ruhr, 533 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
84. State v. Abron, 492 S.W.2d 387 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973); State v.
Cottengim, 12 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. 1928); State v. Egner, 317 Mo. 427, 296 S.W. 145
(1927); State v. McChesney, 185 S.W. 197 (Mo. 1916).
85. State v. Kirkpatrick, 428 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1968); State v. Schuster, 282
S.W.2d 553 (Mo. 1962); State v. Ruhr, 533 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
86. State v. Walker, 484 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1972); State v. Neal, 484 S.W.2d
270 (Mo. 1972); State v. Gray, 423 S.W.2d 776 (Mo. 1968); State v. Beck, 368
S.W.2d 490 (Mo. 1963); State v. Moore, 143 S.W.2d 288 (Mo. 1940); State v.
Catron, 317 Mo. 894, 296 S.W. 141 (1927); State v. Barbour, 234 Mo. 526, 137
S.W. 874 (1911).
The doctrine is also not applicable where the woman is rendered insensible
by intoxicants or drugs. State v. Dusenberry, 112 Mo. 277, 20 S.W. 461 (1892).
It is also rape to have intercourse with a woman of unsound mind. Her
mental condition must be so severe as to totally destroy her capacity to consent,
and the defendant must know of her infirmity. A woman who is too weak-minded
legally to enter into a contract can still consent to sexual intercourse. The burden
is on the state to prove both the severity of the woman's mental condition and
the defendant's knowledge of her incapacity. State v. Robinson, 345 Mo. 897, 136
S.W.2d 1008 (1940); State v. Helderle, 186 S.W. 696 (Mo. En Banc 1916); State
v. Warren, 232 Mo. 185, 134 S.W. 522 (1911).
87. State v. Beck, 368 S.W.2d 490 (Mo. 1963).
88. State v. Gray, 423 S.V.2d 776 (Mo. 1968); State v. Quinn, 405 S.W.2d
895 (Mo. 1966); State v. Baugh, 323 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. En Banc 1959); State v.
Roddy, 171 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. 1943); State v. Lawson, 136 S.W.2d 992 (Mo.
1940); State v. Dilts, 191 Mo. 665, 90 S.W. 782 (1905); State v. Welch, 191 Mo.
179, 89 S.W. 945 (1905); State v. Harris. 150 Mo. 56, 51 S.W. 481 (1899); State
v. Marcks, 140 Mo. 656, 41 S.W. 973 (1897); State v. Dusenberry, 112 Mo. 277, 20
S.W. 461 (1892); State v. Davis, 497 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. App., D. St. L., 1973).
89. State v. Burton, 355 Mo. 467, 196 S.W.2d 621 (1946); State v. Marshall,
354 Mo. 312, 189 S.W.2d 301 (1945); State v. Gruber, 285 S.W. 426 (Mo. 1926);
State v. Donnington, 246 Mo. 343, 151 S.W. 975 (1912); State v. Tevis, 234 Mo.
276, 136 S.W. 339 (1911).
90. State v. Thomas, 351 Mo. 804, 174 S.W.2d 337 (1943). If the conviction
was obtained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix, the
appellate court will closely scrutinize that evidence and reverse if it appears
incredible or too insubstantial. State v. Goodale, 210 Mo. 275, 109 S.W. 9 (1908).
91. The theory applied in admitting the evidence is that "womanly instinct"
1976]
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that the alleged victim failed to do so is admissible,0 2 and the accused
is entitled to a cautionary instruction advising the jury that her failure
to make prompt complaint is a factor to consider in assessing her believa-
bility.98
B. Evidence of the Victim's Character
1. Specific Acts of Immorality
Prior specific acts of voluntary intercourse between the prosecutrix
and the defendant are admissible as tending to show the inclination of
the woman to consent.94 Likewise, evidence of continued friendly inter-
course between defendant and prosecutrix after the alleged rape is admissi-
ble to impeach her testimony.9 5 However, evidence of prior acts of forcible
rape by the accused upon the prosecutrix is inadmissible.9 0 Such acts
are held not to have a tendency to constitute an "antecedent probability"
that defendant committed the act charged.97 This approach is consistent
with the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence of prior criminal
acts against a defendant in a criminal case.
Except in very limited circumstances, evidence of prior specific acts
of intercourse between the prosecutrix and men other than the defendant
is inadmissible for any purpose.93 The prosecuting witness may not be
cross-examined with regard to specific acts of immorality with others, either
prompts the outraged female to make outcry. State v. Richardson, 349 Mo. 1103,
163 S.W.2d 956 (1942). Such evidence is not a necessary element of the state's
case. State v. Garrett, 494 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1973); State v. Miller, 191 Mo. 587,
90 S.W. 767 (1905). Such evidence is admissible only in corroboration of the
prosecutrix and not as independent proof of the crime. State v. Marshall, 354
Mo. 312, 189 S.W.2d 301 (1945); State v. Richardson, 349 Mo. 1103, 163 S.W.2d
956 (1942); State v. Wilkens, 100 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1936); State v. Conrad, 322
Mo. 246, 14 S.W.2d 608 (1928); State v. Taylor, 320 Mo. 417, 8 S.W.2d 29 (1928);
State v. Atkins, 292 S.W. 422 (Mo. 1926); State v. Lawhorn, 250 Mo. 293, 157
S.W. 344 (1913). As a general rule, the details of the outcry or complaint are
inadmissible. State v. Marshall, 354 Mo. 312, 189 S.W.2d 301 (1945); State v.
Parsons, 285 S.W. 412 (Mo. 1926); State v. Burgess, 259 Mo. 383, 168 S.W. 740
(1914); State v. Yocum, 117 Mo. 622, 23 S.W. 765 (1893). However, the details
may come in when drawn from the complainant on cross-examination or intro-
duced to rehabilitate the witness after the introduction of prior inconsistent
extrajudicial statements. State v. Fleming, 354 Mo. 31, 188 S.W.2d 12 (1945);
State v. Lawhorn, 250 Mo. 293, 157 S.W. 344 (1913); State v. Bateman, 198 Mo.
212, 94 S.W. 843 (1906).
92. State v. Palmer, 344 Mo. 1063, 130 S.W.2d 599 (1939); State v. Wilkens,
100 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1936); State v. Bigley, 247 S.W. 169 (Mo. 1922).
93. State v. Thomas, 351 Mo. 804, 174 S.W.2d 337 (1943).
94. State v. Northern, 472 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1971). See also 1 J. WIGMoRE,
EVIDENCE § 200 at 688 (3d ed. 1940); 2 J. WIGMORE, EviDFNCE § 402 at 369 (3d
ed. 1940).
95. State v. Patrick, 107 Mo. 147, 17 S.W. 666 (1891).
96. State v. Lebo, 339 Mo. 960, 98 S.W.2d 695 (1936).
97. Id.
98. State v. Ball, 527 S.W.2d 414 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975); State v. Kirk-
patrick, 428 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1968); State v. Pyle, 343 Mo. 876, 123 S.W.2d 166
(1938); State v. Taylor, 320 Mo. 417, 8 S.W.2d 29 (1928); State v. Hewitt, 259
S.W. 773 (Mo. 1924); State v. Guye, 299 Mo. 348, 252 S.W. 955 (1923); State v.
Osborne, 246 S.W. 878 (Mo. 1922); State v. White, 35 Mo. 500 (1865).
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for impeachment purposes or as bearing on the issue of consent.99 How-
ever, the Missouri Supreme Court has recognized that there may be a
few situations justifying the admission of evidence of specific acts of
unchastity with others. 00 These situations are limited to the rebuttal of
corroborating circumstantial evidence. For example, evidence of a specific
act of intercourse with another would be relevant to explain medical
evidence introduced by the state showing a ruptured hymen, venereal
disease, or pregnancy. 101 Evidence of a specific act of intercourse the same
day with another has been held admissible because it would account for
the presence of sperm in the vagina of the prosecutrix. 0 2 Whenever specific
acts of lewdness and unchastity on the part of the prosecutrix are shown
by the defense for the limited purpose of explaining corroborating cir-
cumstances, such constitutes an attack on the good character of the prose-
cutrix.103 The state may then introduce evidence of the prosecutrix' good
reputation for morality and chastity.104
2. General Reputation of the Victim
The majority of jurisdictions which have considered the question,
including Missouri, have held evidence of the prosecutrix' general reputa-
tion for morality and chastity admissible as bearing on the issue of her
consent.105 In fact, the Fourth Circuit has held that an attorney's failure
to investigate the character of a complainant in a rape case constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel. 06 However, a bad reputation for chastity
is not always admissible; it is not admissible in Missouri as a defense
or in mitigation 0 7 because the lack of chastity may only be shown when
consent is "in issue."' 08 The phrase "in issue" is not defined, but a good
argument can be made that if the defendant denies intercourse and intro-
duces no evidence concerning consent, evidence of the prosecutrix' bad
general reputation for morality would be inadmissible.
The person testifying as to the general reputation of the prosecutrix
must possess the necessary testimonial qualifications-i.e., acquaintance with
the general reputation of the prosecutrix for morality in the neighbor-
99. State v. Kain, 330 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1960); State v. Whipkey, 215 S.W.2d
492 (Mo. 1948); State v. Osborne, 246 S.W. 878 (Mo. 1922).
100. State v. Kain, 330 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1960).
101. 75 C.J.S., Rape § 63 at 535 (1952), cited with approval in State v. Kain,
330 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1960).
102. State v. Daugherty, 126 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. 1939).
103. Id.; State v. Lovitt, 243 Mo. 510, 147 S.W. 484 (1912); State v. Jones,
191 Mo. 653, 90 S.W. 465 (1905); State v. Speritus, 191 Mo. 24, 90 S.W. 459 (1905).
104. Id.
105. 1 J. WIGAIORE, EVIDENCE § 62 at 464 (3d ed. 1940).
106. Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968).
107. State v. Catron, 817 Mo. 894, 296 S.W. 141 (1927).
108. State v. Yowell, 513 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. En Banc 1974); State v. Kirk-
patrick, 428 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1968); State v. Kain, 330 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1960);
State v. Taylor, 320 Mo. 417, 8 S.W.2d 29 (1928); State v. Ruhr, 533 S.W.2d 656
(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976); State v. Ball, 527 S.W.2d 414 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1975).
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hood or among people with whom the prosecutrix associates.' 00 The
testimony given must be general and not specific. For example, testimony
that the prosecutrix was reputed to have given birth to an illegitimate
child is evidence of a specific act and therefore not admissible." 0
The general rule in Missouri and most jurisdictions is that the credi-
bility of a witness may not be impeached by a showing that his general
reputation for morality is bad. An attack on credibility must be addressed
to the reputation of the witness for truth and veracity."' Many writers,
notably Professor Wigmore,"1 2 advocate an exception to the general rule
which would admit general reputation evidence to impeach the testimony
of the alleged victim in prosecutions of men charged with sexual crimes
against women. Wigmore's rationale for the exception was to provide
protection against "the sinister possibilities of injustice that lurk in believ-
ing such a witness without careful psychiatric scrutiny."" 8 Wigmore's
fear was that women who have what he called an "unchaste mentality"
tend to contrive false charges of sexual offenses by innocent men, and the
sympathy naturally felt for a wronged female would "give easy credit to
such plausible tale. 114 In State v. Kain"r Missouri rejected Wigmore's
proposed exception and adopted the general rule even in rape prosecu-
tions:
The prosecutors and trial courts already have a considerable
latitude in dealing with the abuses suggested by Professor Wigmore.
There is no assurance that permitting the witness' credibility to
be attacked by proof of her bad repute for chastity would remedy
the situation and it might open the door to other and greater
abuses."18
C. Evidence of the Defendant's Character
1. Specific Acts of Immorality
As a general rule, specific acts of immorality are not admissible against
the defendant. However, there are a few limited exceptions. Evidence of
prior convictions can be used to impeach,117 but evidence of other crimes,
absent a conviction, is only admissible if it tends to establish motive, intent,
absence of mistake or accident, common scheme or plan, or the identity
109. State v. Kain, 330 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1960). See also, State v. Deshon, 334
Mo. 862, 68 S.W.2d 805 (1934); State v. Fairlamb, 121 Mo. 137, 25 S.W. 895 (1894).
110. State v. Yowell, 513 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
111. State v. Rand, 496 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973); State v. Lora,
305 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1957); State v. Whipkey, 358 Mo. 563, 215 S.W.2d 492
(1948); State v. Hayes, 356 Mo. 1033, 204 S.W.2d 723 (1947); State v. Menz,
314 Mo. 74, 106 S.W.2d 440 (1937); State v. Williams, 337 Mo. 884, 87 S.W.2d
175 (1935).
112. 3 J. WimoR,, Evmr NC § 924 (a) at 459 (3d ed. 1940).
113. Id. at 460.
114. Id. at 459.
115. 330 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1960). See also State v. Hayes, 856 Mo. 1033, 204
S.W.2d 723 (1947).
116. 330 S.W.2d at 845.
117. § 491.050, RSMo 1969; State v. Byrth, 395 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. 1965).
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of the person on trial118 In State v. Mitchell"1 9 defendant made an issue
of his identity. Therefore, evidence of a second rape which occurred a
few minutes after the rape for which he was on trial, was held admissible
to show the opportunity to commit the first rape and the identity of the
defendant as the rapist. Also, crimes committed in a chain of events are
admissible because they tend to establish the crime charged.12 0 For example,
when the defendant shot one person, kidnapped two others, and eventually
raped one of the hostages, evidence of the shooting and the kidnapping
was held admissible in the rape prosecution.' 2 '
2. General Reputation of Defendant
Missouri courts recognize that when a person is being prosecuted for
a crime such as forcible rape, the trial must be conducted with "scrupulous
fairness" in order to avoid adding additional prejudice to that which
the charge itself frequently produces. 122 However, if the defendant takes
the stand in his own behalf, he is subject to the same impeachment as
any other witness. 123 There is an old line of cases holding that any witness
could be impeached by a showing of his general bad reputation for morality
(as opposed to reputation for truth and veracity). 24 The same rule was
applied to defendants, 2 5 including defendants in rape prosecutions. 2 6
This rule was reversed in 1935 as to both witnessesl27 and defendants in
State v. Williams:128
[To] avoid ambiguity and injustice to the defendant as far as
possible, it seems better that the impeaching testimony should be
confined to the real and ultimate object of the inquiry, which is
the reputation of the witness for truth and veracity. 29
Thus, the present rule is that the only general reputation evidence
118. State v. Mitchell, 491 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
119. 491 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
120. State v. Pollard, 447 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. 1969).
121. Id. Any crime committed as a part of the res gestae is admissible. State
v. Moore, 353 S.W.2d 712 (Mo. 1962) (stealing the victim's purse).
122. State v. Gentry, 320 Mo. 389, 8 S.W.2d 20 (1928).
123. § 546.260, RSMo 1969; Berra v. United States, 221 F.2d 590 (1955),
aff'd, 351 U.S. 131 (1956); State v. Hammilton, 310 S.W.2d 909 (Mo. 1955); State
v. Baker, 209 Mo. 444, 108 S.W. 6 (1908); State v. Shanks, 150 Mo. App. 370, 130
S.W. 451 (St. L. Ct. App. 1910).
124. State v. Shields, 13 Mo. 236 (1850).
125. State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380 (1878).
126. State v. Taylor, 320 Mo. 417, 8 S.W.2d 29 (1928); State v. Gentry, 320
Mo. 389, 8 S.W.2d 20 (1928).
127. The Williams opinion refers to Professor Wigmore's theory proposing an
exception when impeaching a prosecutrix in a rape prosecution and specifically
states that the opinion does not apply to this situation. However, Wigmore's
theory has been rejected in Missouri. State v. Kain, 330 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1960).
128. 337 Mo. 884, 87 S.W.2d 175 (En Banc 1935).
129. Id. at 898, 87 S.W.2d at 182. In so holding, the court reversed a second
degree murder conviction because the trial court permitted the state in rebuttal
to appellant's testimony to prove that appellant had a bad general reputation
for morality in the community.
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admissible to impeach the credibility of a defendant charged with forcible
rape is his general reputation for truth and veracity.13 0
V. CONCLUSION
Although the present law in Missouri regarding the admissibility of
character evidence in rape prosecutions is not as irrational nor anti-victim
as some have alleged, there are some areas in need of reform. In determin-
ing what evidence should go to the jury, a careful weighing of the com-
peting interests must be made. Rape subjects the victim to tremendous
psychological damage as well as physical injury. Few men, save those
prisoners subjected to brutal homosexual attack, can really understand
the fear, humiliation, and shame suffered by the victim of a rape. Intro-
duction of evidence attacking the victim's character aggravates this psycho-
logical damage. Yet, such evidence may be the only defense available.
Rape is rarely witnessed by anyone other than the victim and the rapist.
Because a rape trial is often by necessity a swearing match between the
victim and the defendant, evidence of credibility is often essential. More-
over, the defendant in a rape prosecution faces the mose severe penalty
the law can impose13' and must be guaranteed a fair trial.
The jury is normally required to decide one of two questions in
forcible rape prosecutions: (1) whether the defendant is the man who
committed the crime, a question of identity; or (2) whether the woman
voluntarily engaged in the act, a question of consent. If the issue is identity,
character evidence has no relevance and should be inadmissible. The Mis-
souri courts have properly recognized this by allowing such evidence only
when consent is "in issue." However, this phrase should be more clearly
defined and there should be a clear prohibition of character evidence when
consent is not the issue.
When consent is the question, Missouri courts have properly recog-
nized that prior acts of intimacy betveen defendant and prosecutrix have
some relevance and may therefore be considered by the jury. They have
also properly recognized that specific acts with others are normally irrele-
vant. However, Missouri courts have improperly assumed that the general
reputation of the victim for morality is always indicative of whether she
consented to the act in question. There should be a presumption against
the admissibility of this type of evidence. An absolute prohibition may
prejudice a defendant in the rare case where there is some special reason
for its relevance. Therefore, the logical solution is to provide for the judge
to hear, out of the presence of the jury, the evidence which the defendant
wishes to offer together with the reasons for its relevance in that particular
180. 'State v. Williams, 492 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1978).
181. The maximum penalty stated in the statute is death. However, in light
of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 288 (1972) which held the imposition and carry-
ing out of the death penalty at the discretion of the jury to be cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments, presently
the maximum penalty is life imprisonment.
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